URS Corporation Ltd (Appellant) v BDW Trading Ltd (Respondent) [2025] UKSC 21
The Supreme Court has today (21st May 2025) dismissed URS Corporation’s appeal on all four grounds. Camilla Chorfi was part of the team instructed by the Secretary of State, who intervened in the proceedings.
The appeal concerned whether BDW, a major residential developer, could recover the costs of extensive remedial works it undertook on two high‑rise developments after discovering significant structural design defects attributable to URS, the consulting engineers. BDW had already sold off its proprietary interests, no claims had been made by owners or occupiers, and any such claims would have been time‑barred. Nonetheless, in light of post‑Grenfell investigations revealing widespread safety risks across the UK housing stock, BDW considered the defects dangerous and carried out remedial works between 2020 and 2021. It then sued URS in negligence to recover the repair costs.
In 2021 Fraser J held, following a trial of preliminary issues that:
- the scope of URS’s duty of care included the losses claimed (save for the claim for reputational damage);
- the losses claimed were recoverable in principle and not too remote;
- issues of legal causation and mitigation should be determined at trial.
However, in June 2022, s. 135 of the Building Safety Act 2022 (BSA) came into force. It retrospectively extended the limitation period for accrued claims under s.1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972 (DPA) from 6 to 30 years. S.1 DPA imposes a duty on developers (like BDW) and consultant engineers (like URS) to build dwellings properly. BDW applied, successfully, to amend the proceedings to introduce new claims against URS under s.1 DPA and Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (CLCA).
URS appealed both the preliminary issue and the amendment application decisions. In July 2023, the Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed URS’s appeals. The Supreme Court granted URS permission to appeal on four grounds:
- whether BDW’s losses were irrecoverable because the works were voluntarily incurred and thus outside the scope of URS’s duty of care or too remote;
- whether s.135 BSA retrospectively extended limitation periods to BDW’s s.1 DPA claims;
- whether URS owed BDW a statutory duty under s.1 DPA; and
- whether BDW could claim contribution under the CLCA, despite no third‑party claim having been brought.
Ground 1 – Recoverability of BDW’s Repair Costs
URS contended that BDW’s decision to remediate the defects despite having no extant proprietary interest in the developments or legal obligation to do so broke the chain of causation or rendered the losses too remote.
The Supreme Court held that any notion of “voluntariness” relates, if at all, to issues of causation and mitigation, and not to duty of care or remoteness. On the assumed facts for the appeal, no such causation issue arose. BDW’s repair costs were therefore recoverable.
Further, on the assumed facts, it was strongly arguable that BDW did not perform the repairs voluntarily, give the risks of personal injury or death to the homeowners if it did not do so.
Ground 2 – Retrospective Effect of Section 135 of the Building Safety Act 2022
URS’s submissions on retrospectivity were also rejected. URS argued that the presumption against retrospective legislation should limit the effect of s.135, particularly regarding what it called “collateral issues.” The Supreme Court disagreed.
Section 135(3) BSA refers to “an action by virtue of” s.1 DPA, and is not limited to actions “under” that provision. There was no reason to restrict s.135(3) BSA to actions under the DPA, considering the meaning of the words in context.
Furthermore, a central policy objective of the BSA was to ensure that those responsible for historic building safety defects can be held to account. This purpose would be undermined if s.135(3) BSA were restricted to actions under s.1 DPA, by limiting any ‘onward’ claims that the developer might make against, say, a contractor directly responsible for the defect. That would result in incoherence and may penalise responsible developers who are proactive in identifying and remedying building safety defects.
Ground 3 – Duty of Care Under Section 1(1)(a) of the Defective Premises Act 1972
The Court held that URS did owe BDW a duty under s. 1(1)(a) DPA. BDW, as the party at whose order the dwellings were constructed, fell squarely within the statutory category of persons to whom the duty is owed. The purpose of the s.1 DPA duty was to protect the interests of those who: (i) acquire an interest in a dwelling; and (ii) have an interest in the dwelling other than by acquisition or purchase – including the first owner. There is no reason why a developer cannot both owe a duty and be a owed a duty.
URS argued that BDW’s losses were not of a recoverable type because BDW no longer owned the dwellings and had not suffered loss arising from owning an unfit property. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, holding that once the statutory duty is established, there is no basis to restrict recoverable loss in this way.
Ground 4 – Contribution Claim
The Supreme Court also upheld BDW’s entitlement to pursue a contribution claim under s.1 CLCA even though BDW had no judgment or settlement against it; and no third party had issued or intimated any claim. The right to contribution arises when:
- damage has been suffered by C for which D1 and D2 are each liable; and
- D1 has paid or been ordered or agreed to pay compensation for the damage to C. At that point, but not before, D1 is entitled to recover contribution from D2
BDW had paid compensation (in kind) for the damage suffered by the homeowners by carrying out the repairs.
The decision accordingly provides reassurance to those taking responsible prompt remedial action, clarifying the framework for fair costs distribution among all liable parties.
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