Top 3 Cases of May 2026 01 June 2026
Zaman v Leeds City Council [2026] UKUT 180 (LC)
Summary
The Upper Tribunal dismissed an appeal against financial penalties under the Housing Act 2004 for failure to comply with selective licensing requirements.
The premises in question were an end-of-terrace house, converted into 4 self-contained residential units. The area was subject to selective licensing under Part 3 of the Housing Act 2004, but the appellant had failed to obtain a licence when required to do so. The local authority issued 4 penalty notices under s.95, i.e. one for each unit. The appellant appealed, arguing that (a) the whole building was an HMO for the purposes of Part 2 of the Act, and therefore exempt from the Part 3 licensing regime, or (b) if the Part 3 regime did apply, there was only one house requiring a licence, so there should have been one penalty, not four.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fact that the whole building was an HMO within the Part 2 provisions did not prevent each unit being a ‘house’ for the purposes of Part 3 licensing.
Why it’s important
The licensing requirements for landlords can vary significantly from area to area, and the statutory provisions under both Part 2 and Part 3 of the Act are complex. This judgment provides a useful explanation of the interplay between the two, and reinforces that it should not be assumed that because a building, or part it, fits the definitions in one part of the statute does not mean that the possibility that other licences are necessary can be ignored.
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Roxlena Ltd v The Ramblers' Association & Ors, R (On the Application Of) [2026] EWCA Civ 534
Summary
The Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the phrase “actually enjoyed by the public as of right and without interruption for a full period of 20 years" in s.31 Highways Act 1981, which provides that where a way has been so used by the public, it is presumed to be dedicated as a highway.
A council produced a definitive map in exercise of its powers under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, which included a number of new footpaths and bridleways over the appellant’s land. The appellant objected to the inclusion of those paths, causing an inquiry to be held.
At the inquiry, the inspector concluded that there had been an 4-month intermission in use during an outbreak of foot and mouth disease, the effect of which was that the requisite period of actual enjoyment could not be made out.
The inspector’s decision was successfully challenged by the Ramblers Association by way of judicial review. The appellant brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The inspector had failed to have regard to fact that public use had resumed following the outbreak, which was an error of law.
Why it’s important
This case clarifies the distinction between an ‘intermission’ in prescriptive use, which is a break in the continuity of use such as in this case, and an ‘interruption’, which requires some form of obstruction or overt act.
Although the specific statutory context of this decision is highways legislation, the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the relevant doctrines (which includes a useful, authoritative summary of the law) is likely to be of relevance to practitioners dealing with prescriptive periods in other contexts, such as prescriptive easements or town and village greens.
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Bennets Courtyard Ltd v Bennets Courtyard Airspace Ltd [2026] EWHC 1119 (Ch)
Summary
The High Court considered the meaning of the words "the person who owns the freehold of those premises" in the context of a claim for collective enfranchisement.
The freehold of the premises in question had been sold, but the transfer had not yet been completed by registration at the time when an initial notice under s.13 Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 was given (although an application had been made and was eventually completed). The notice was given only to the transferee (the equitable owner), not to the transferor (the legal owner).
At first instance, the judge determined that the notice had not been given to the reversioner as required. That conclusion has now been upheld on appeal.
Why it’s important
The question of whether an initial notice under the 1993 Act should be given to the transferor or the transferee during the registration gap was, until this decision, free from authority. The conclusion that it is the easily-identified registered owner who needs to be served, whether or not any application is pending, brings helpful clarity for practitioners.
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Finally, readers may recall that back in March, we covered the first instance decision in Park Cakes Limited v Caterpillar Property Limited, which determined that a tenant’s option to renew was not an agreement for a future tenancy of the holding such as to take the lease outside Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. Our colleague James Andrew-Tipler appeared for the successful respondent in an expedited leapfrog appeal to the Court of Appeal: you can find his analysis of that decision here.
Download: Top 3 Cases of May 2026
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